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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVIS & SANCHEZ, PLLC, : 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, : 
v. : CaseNo.20110131-CA 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HEALTH CARE, : 
Defendant / Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT / APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)0) (West 2009). On March 2,2011, the Utah Supreme 
Court transferred this action to this Court pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Plaintiff law firm seek attorney fees for services it performed in a workers 
compensation action before the Utah Labor Commission. Plaintiff did not raise this issue 
in the workers compensation proceedings, but filed this separate, collateral, action 
instead. Did the trial court correctly dismiss this action for lack of jurisdiction? 
1 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW: This issue was raised in the defendant's motion 
for judgment on the pleadings (R. 42) and was the basis of the trial court's decision. R. 
172-75. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction 
presents a question of law[,] which we review under a correction of error standard, giving 
no particular deference to the trial court's determination." Bauer v. Dep't of Workforce 
Serv.. 2005 UT App 488, f 14,128 P.3d 1204 (internal quotations omitted). 
2. Utah's statutes only authorized attorney fees on workers compensation medical 
benefits in very limited circumstances not applicable to this action. Plaintiff asked the 
trial court to grant such fees under the common law contrary to the applicable statute. 
Does such a cause of action exist? 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW: This issue was raised in the defendant's motion 
for judgment on the pleadings. R. 40-43. The trial court did not reach this issue, having 
dismissed this matter for lack of jurisdiction. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "In matters of pure statutory interpretation, an 
appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling for correctness and gives no deference to its 
legal conclusions." Stephens v. Bonneville Travel. Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
All such provisions are set forth verbatim in Addendum A to this brief. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff law firm, Davis & Sanchez, PLLC, represented Alvaro Diaz in a 
workers compensation claim against his employer, Beehive Telephone. R. 1. The 
administrative action resulted in a settlement agreement and order being signed on 
September 9, 2008. R. 28-34. Mr. Diaz received a lump sum disability payment, part of 
which was awarded to the plaintiff as its attorney fees. R. 30. Beehive Telephone, and its 
insurer, also agreed to pay Mr. Diaz's medical bills, with the exception of some claims 
not relevant to the present litigation, and hold Mr. Diaz harmless from any outstanding 
medical bills. R. 30-32. 
Plaintiff law firm later filed this action seeking attorney fees from University of 
Utah Health Care (Hospital), one of the entities that had treated Mr. Diaz. R. 1-6. 
Plaintiff claimed that the Hospital owes it attorney fees for the law firm's work in 
obtaining payment from Beehive Telephone of Mr. Diaz's medical bills. Davis & 
Sanchez PLLC alleged that the fees were due under the "common fund" doctrine. R. 
171. 
The defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. R. 36-48. The 
motion was treated as a motion for summary judgment because both parties relied upon 
documents outside the pleadings. R. 170. On January 10, 2011, the trial court dismissed 
this action for lack of jurisdiction. The court determined that the Labor Commission had 
exclusive jurisdiction to award attorney fees to a claimant's attorney concerning a 
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workers compensation matter. R. 170-75. Plaintiff filed its notice of appeal on February 
3,2011. R. 177-79. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah State Legislature gave "full power to regulate and fix the fees" of 
attorneys in all cases that come before the Labor Commission to the commission. Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-1-309(1) (West 2004).* The commission had exclusive jurisdiction to 
award attorney fees from the benefits awarded in the workers compensation action. The 
trial court correctly dismissed this action for lack of jurisdiction. 
Utah's statute does not authorize the attorney fee sought by the plaintiff law firm. 
Reasonable attorney fees were only permitted from medical benefits if no disability or 
death benefits were also being awarded. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-l-309(4)(a) (West 
2004). Mr. Diaz was awarded disability benefits and the plaintiff law firm was awarded 
attorney fees that were paid from that award. R. 30. Plaintiff failed to state a cause of 
action under the common law. Such a claim could not exist where it would be contrary to 
the statute. 
1
 In the Brief of Appellant, the plaintiff cites to a more recent version of this 
statute than the one in effect at the time of Mr. Diaz's administrative proceeding. 
Because there are material differences, the defendant Hospital uses the earlier version of 
the statute. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT IT WAS 
WITHOUT SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff law firm seeks attorney fees for work performed in a workers 
compensation action. In that proceeding, the law firm represented the claimant, Mr. Diaz. 
The firm was successful in obtaining disability and medical benefits for its client. Part of 
the medical benefits were for the purpose of paying medical bills owed by Mr. Diaz to the 
Hospital. The law firm obtained attorney fees in the administrative action based upon the 
disability benefits awarded to Mr. Diaz. The firm did not seek any fees based upon the 
medical benefits. Instead the law firm has brought this separate action for fees allegedly 
earned in the workers compensation proceeding. 
"As a general rule, parties must exhaust applicable administrative remedies as a 
prerequisite to seeking judicial review." Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 
74, ^[14,34 P.3d 180 (internal quotations omitted). "Where this precondition to suit is not 
satisfied, courts lack subject matter jurisdiction." Hous. Auth. of the County of Salt Lake 
v. Snvder. 2002 UT 28,111,44 P.3d 724. The plaintiff was required to exhaust its 
administrative remedy. It should have sought all attorney fees to which it felt entitled in 
the proceeding before the Labor Commission. Its failure to do so meant that the trial 
court was without subject matter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs claim. 
"In all cases coming before the commission in which attorneys have been 
employed, the commission is vested with full power to regulate and fix the fees of the 
5 
attorneys." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-309 (West 2004). The trial court correctly 
determined that this statute was applicable to the plaintiff. The plaintiff law firm was 
employed to represent a party before the commission. If the plaintiff felt itself entitled to 
a further fee, beyond that awarded by the commission, it should have raised this issue in 
the workers compensation action. Attorneys have the right to appeal administratively 
decisions concerning attorney fees. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-309(2) (West 2004). The 
commission could have considered the claim and plaintiff could have obtained judicial 
review through the courts of the commission's decision. 
In the Brief of Appellant, plaintiff sets out examples where attorneys who are 
tangentially involved in a workers compensation action are still permitted to seek attorney 
fees other than those provided by statute. Brief of Appellant at 10-14. But plaintiff fails 
to acknowledge that this statute expressly grants the commission "full power to regulate" 
the fees for attorneys, like the plaintiff, who are employed by parties in actions before the 
commission. 
The requirement to exhaust administrative remedies does not apply only to direct 
judicial review of administrative decisions. Snyder involved an unlawful detainer action. 
Federal law required that the housing authority provide an administrative grievance 
hearing before it could seek to evict a tenant. Snyder, 2002 UT 28 at ^[13. Because the 
authority had failed to make an administrative hearing available to Snyder, the Supreme 
Court held that the courts were without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the separate 
unlawful detainer action. 
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Housing Authority therefore failed to exhaust its administrative remedies 
and had no right to seek relief from the district court. As a result, the 
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Housing Authority's 
unlawful detainer action. 
Id. at TJ22 (citation omitted). 
Nor do any of the exceptions to the exhaustion remedy apply. 
As a general rule, parties must exhaust applicable administrative 
remedies as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review. Exceptions to this 
rule exist in unusual circumstances where it appears that there is a 
likelihood that some oppression or injustice is occurring such that it would 
be unconscionable not to review the alleged grievance or where it appears 
that exhaustion would serve no useful purpose. There is no question but 
that the law does not require litigants to do a futile or vain act, but HTC has 
not convinced us that appealing the city's rejection of its application in the 
manner required by state statute and city ordinance would have been futile. 
Holladay Towne Ctr. v. Holladay City, 2008 UT App 301, Tf6,192 P.3d 302 (citations 
omitted) (internal quotations omitted). In rejecting a claim of unusual circumstances, this 
Court held that political considerations that might impact Holladay City's decisions in the 
administrative proceedings did not meet the unusual circumstances exception. Holladay 
City. 2008 UT App 301 at f7. 
Section 309 gives the commission the "full power to regulate" attorney fees for 
attorneys hired to represent parties to workers compensation actions. The commission, 
and not the trial court, had jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs attorney fees claim. The 
trial court correctly dismissed this matter for lack of jurisdiction. That decision should be 
affirmed on appeal. 
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II. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES IS CONTRARY 
TO UTAH'S STATUTES 
Plaintiff asked the trial court to create a common law action for attorney fees 
contrary to the statutory law of Utah. The Labor Commission is the exclusive forum for 
obtaining payment for medical bills resulting from workplace injuries. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-407(25) (West 2004). At the time of Mr. Diaz's workers compensation 
proceeding, attorney fees could be awarded based on medical benefits received, as 
opposed to disability and death benefits, "[i]f the commission orders that only medical 
benefits be paid." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-l-309(4)(a) (West 2004). If at any time 
disability or death benefits were at issue in the proceeding, no attorney fees based on 
medical benefits could be awarded. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-l-309(4)(a)(ii) (West 2004). 
Nor does the statute provide for a medical provider to pay any attorney fees. Instead, 
such fees are to be paid by the employer or its insurer. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-
309(4)(b) (West 2004). 
Utah's worker compensation laws preclude the existence of the common law claim 
urged by the plaintiff. It is contrary to the "full power to regulate" fees for the attorney of 
parties to such proceedings granted by the statute. It is also contrary to the express 
statutory prohibition on the awarding of attorney fees where either disability or death 
benefits were obtained, as in the proceeding in question. 
In workers1 compensation cases, however, the Wforkers'] 
Compensation] A[ct] provides a detailed statutory scheme governing how 
an employer's or insurance carrier's subrogation right may be exercised and 
how proceeds from an action against a culpable third party are to be 
8 
distributed. "We have long held that where a conflict arises between the 
common law and a statute or constitutional law, the common law must 
yield, because the common law cannot be an authority in opposition to our 
positive enactments." 
Anderson v. United Parcel Serv., 2004 UT :> /, %iz, y> :* • •* 
Plaintiff seeks to use the common law as an authority in opposition to the positive 
enactments of the workers compensation statutes. This it cannot do. The Utah Supreme 
••Court has applied a two-tiered analysis fo determine w I in tier a statutory enactment 
preempts the recognition of a common cause of action. Gottling v. r.K. Inc., 2. TT 95, 
\8, 61 P 3d 989. First, whether the statute reveals an explicit intent to preempt common 
law claims. Allot iiaf i\ vl\, w lusher such a common law claim would "stand as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and'execution of the-, full puiposr -iiui obfoetives" of the'statute. 
Id 
The workers compensation statutes meet both of these tests. Section 309 gives the 
Labor Commission "full power to regulate and fix the fees of the attorneys" who 
represent parties to worker compensation actions. Further, to cirate such a common law 
right to attorney fees would be an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of the statutes. 
The statute expressly pr< ilnbited attorney fees paid from medical benefits in the 
circumstances of the Diaz action. To create such n iuiiiitiwu, !»iv, ,-<mseoi action is exactly 
what the Supreme Court refused to do in Gottling. That Court held that a statutory cause 
of action fliat was liniift\l to claims, against employers with a certain number of 
9 
employees precluded the creation of a similar common law cause of action against 
smaller employers. 
Even if the trial court had jurisdiction, the dismissal of the plaintiffs action should 
be affirmed because the complaint failed to state a claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly held that it was without jurisdiction to consider Davis & 
Sanchez, PLLC's complaint. Further, the complaint failed to state claim for relief. The 
dismissal of this action should be affirmed on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 3/ day of May, 2011. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for University of Utah Health Care 
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ADDENDUM "A 
Utah* o<l<» Vim. t; UA I 309 (West 2004) 
Attorney fees 
(1) In all cases coming before the commission in which attorneys have been employed, the 
commission is vested with full power to regulate and fix the fees of the attorneys. 
(2) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, an attorney may 
file an application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication to appeal a decision or final 
order to the extent it concerns the award of attorney fees. 
(3)(a) The commission may award reasonable attorneys' fees on a contingency basis when 
disability or death benefits or interest on disability or death benefits are generated. 
(b) Attorney fees awarded under Subsection (3)(a) shall be paid by the employer or its insurance 
carrier out of the award of disability or death benefits, or interest on disability or death benefits. 
(4)(a) If the commission orders that only medical benefits be paid, the commission may award 
reasonable attorney fees on a contingency basis for medical benefits ordered paid if: 
(i) the commission's informal dispute resolution mechanisms were fully used by the parties prior 
to adjudication; and 
(ii) at no time were disability or death benefits or interest on disability or death benefits at issue 
in the adjudication of the medical benefit claim.(b) Attorneys' fees awarded under Subsection 
(3)(a) shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier in addition to the payment of medical 
benefits ordered. 
(b) Attorney fees awarded under Subsection (3)(a) shall be paid by the employer or its 
insurance carrier out of the award of disability or death benefits, or interest on disability 
or death benefits. 
(4)(a) If the commission orders that only medical benefits be paid, the commission may 
award reasonable attorney fees on a contingency basis for medical benefits ordered paid 
if: 
(i) the commission's informal dispute resolution mechanisms were fully used by the 
parties prior to adjudication; and 
(ii) at no time were disability or death benefits or interest on disability or death benefits at 
issue in the adjudication of the medical benefit claim.(b) Attorneys' fees awarded under 
Subsection (3)(a) shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier in addition to the 
payment of medical benefits ordered. 
ADDENDUM "B 
JAN 10 Z011 
SAUtAKfcOOUNTV ^ 
B
* • •B.puty Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS a SANCHEZ, I'LLC,' : 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UNIVERSITY OF U i 
HEALTHCARE, 
Defendant. 
M l M O U A I N I M I I M 1)1 ( I ' I I O N 
Case No. 100913499 
Judge: Demi (i llimonas 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff, the law firm of Davis & Sanchez (the "Law Firm"), and defendant, University of 
Utah University Health Care (the "Hospital"), brought cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings 
pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, in as much as the parties 
presented "matters outside the pleadings," I treat the motions as having been brought for summary 
judgment under Rule 56 and dispose of them accordingly. Ut. R. Civ. P. 12. 
BACKGROUND 
Alvaro Diaz suffered ankle and knee injuries while working for Beehive Telephone. He 
received treatment for his injuries and for allegedly related complications at, among other medical 
care providers, the Hospital. The cost of the treatment "totaled in excess of $550,000.00." 
Complaint, f 5 (brackets omitted); see also Amended Answer, f 5. 
Mr. Diaz sought disability compensation and medical benefits for his injuries in an action 
before the Utah Labor Commission stvled Alvaro Diaz v. Beehive Televhone and/or Workers 
Compensation bund, case no. 08-0020. The I ,aw I• irm represented him in this action. The LawFirm 
also sought, but did not receive, consent to represent the Hospital's interests in the action before the 
Labor Commission. 
The parties in the workers' compensation action, through mediation, were able to come to 
a compromise. As part of the compromise, the Workers' Compensation Fund, on behalf of Beehive 
Telephone, agreed to reimburse the medical care providers for certain medical expenses incurred in 
treating Mr. Diaz. More specifically, the Law Firm alleges that u[a]s a direct result of [its] efforts 
in mediation, the [Hospital] has been paid to date approximately $347,000.00 by the [Workers' 
Compensation Fund] for Alvaro Diaz's medical bills." Complaint, f 7; see also Amended Answer, 
If 7. 
Based on this recovery, the Law Firm seeks from the Hospital "[p]ayment of a 33% 
attorney's fee, or $114,551.00, on [the] approximately $347,000.00 already collected on behalf of 
the [the Hospital] due to [the Law Firm's] efforts." Complaint, p. 3. The theory behind the 
Complaint, while not altogether clear, appears to be that the Law Firm is entitled to attorney fees 
under the "common fund" doctrine in order to prevent the Hospital's unjust enrichment. See 
Complaint, f 2. 
ANALYSIS 
The Hospital has advanced three independent reasons for summary adjudication. First, the 
Hospital argues that it is immune from suit under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 63G-7-101, et seq. Second, it argues that the Law Firm "has not pled sufficient facts to 
invoke the common fund doctrine." Def s mem. re judgment on the pleadings, p. 5 (capitalization 
omitted). And third, it argues that "the Labor Commission has been delegated the exclusive 
2 
authority by the legislature to award attorney's fees in worker's [sic] compensation cases." Id, p. 
6 (capitalization omitted). 
The third argument, which is essntially an argument that the district court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction, is dispositive. Therefore, I decline to address the governmental immunity and common 
fund arguments.1 
The "primary objective" of Utah's courts in "interpreting statutes is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent. To discern legislative intent, we look first to the statute's plain language." State 
v. Harker, 2010 UT 56, f 12, 240 P.3d 780 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In 
doing so, "we read the plain language of a statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in harmony 
with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Id., (internal quotation marks, brackets, 
and citations omitted). 
It is apparent from the plain language of Utah's Labor Commission and Workers' 
Compensation Acts (Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1 -101, et seq and Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-101, et seq, 
respectively)2 that the legislature intended that the Labor Commission determine the award of 
attorney fees attendant to a workers' compensation action. Section 34A-1-301 provides that the 
"commission has the duty and full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply 
lA court must first satisfy itself that it has subject matter jurisdiction. It should conclude its 
inquiry when it determines that jurisdiction is lacking. See Western Water, LLC v. Olds, 2008 UT 18, f 
16, 184P.3d578. 
2The legislature amended both Acts in 2008 and 2009. Because neither party has addressed the 
differences between the provisions previously in place and those currently in place, and because the 
changes do not appear to impact my analysis, I quote from the current version of the code. 
3 
the law in this chapter [34A-1] or any other title or chapter it administers," including the Workers' 
Compensation Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-103(1).3 
The power and jurisdiction of the Labor Commission encompasses the determination of 
"whether medical, nurse, or hospital services" are compensable under the Workers' Compensation 
Act. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-409(l 1). Indeed, except for circumstances not present here, a health 
care provider "may not maintain a cause of action in any forum within this state other than the 
[Commission for collection" of the health-related goods and services that are compensable under 
the Workers' Compensation Act. Id. 
The power and jurisdiction of the Commission further extends to the determination of 
attorney fees: "In a case before the [C]ommission in which an attorney is employed, the 
[Commission has the full power to regulate and fix the fees of the attorney." Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-1-309(1). Notably, this power extends to the ability to "award reasonable attorney fees on a 
contingency basis for medical benefits ordered paid " Id, § 34A-l-309(4).4 
The Law Firm contends that, despite this statutory language, the district court has 
jurisdiction, (1) under the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (see Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-501), 
and (2) because neither the Workers' Compensation Act nor the regulations promulgated thereunder 
"address . . . [or] regulate the attorney's fees . . . paid by any party other than the injured worker." 
Pltf s mem. re judgment on the pleadings, pp. 7-8. Both arguments fail. 
3The Utah Supreme Court has declared that this "jurisdiction" is exclusive with respect to "cases 
that fall within the purview of the Workers' Compensation Act." Sheppick v. Albertson 's, Inc., 922 P.2d 
769, 773 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). 
4The Commission's power to award contingency fees based on an award of such medical benefits 
is not, however, unfettered. Utah Code Ann., § 34A-l-309(4). 
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As to the first argument, the Law Firm contends that "[t]he district courts have exclusive 
original jurisdiction over any action brought under . . . [the Governmental Immunity Act]." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-7-501. In making this argument, the Law Firm assumes that the Governmental 
Immunity Act applies to its claim for attorney fees, which is plainly equitable in nature. It does not. 
[I]t is well settled that there is no governmental immunity for 
equitable claims. See American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 
840 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1992) ("This court long has recognized a 
common law exception to governmental immunity for equitable 
claims. Neither the passage of time nor the enactment of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act has eroded this exception." (Citations 
omitted)). 
Culberston v. Bd. of County Comm 'rs of Salt Lake County, 2008 UT App 22, \ 20, 177 P.3d 621. 
As to the second argument, it is true that "there may be certain common law claims under 
the [Workers' Compensation] Act that 'could be adjudicated only in the district court... [because] 
the Commission has neither the authority nor the jurisdiction to adjudicate [such claims]." Working 
RX, Inc. v. Workers3 Compensation Fund, et ai, 2007 UT App 376, % 173 P.3d 853 (quoting, 
Sheppick, 922 P.2d at 775-76 (some brackets in original, others added)).5 But here, and as noted 
above, the Labor Commission plainly has the authority and jurisdiction to address all attorney fee 
issues: "In a case before the [Commission in which an attorney is employed, the [Commission has 
full power to regulate and fix the fees of the attorney." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-309(1) (emphasis 
added). 
5In Sheppick the plaintiff sought to bring a bad refusal to bargain against his employer and his 
employer's workers' compensation administrator in district court. The Supreme Court rejected this 
claim, holding that the facts plaintiff alleged "failed to establish district court jurisdiction to adjudicate 
such a claim." 922 P.2d at 776. 
5 
This sweeping language is not limited, as the Law Firm argues, to fees paid by the injured 
party. Rather, the provision comprehends all of the fees related to the workers' compensation 
litigation. See Stokes v. Flanders, 970 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1998) ("On its face this provision 
gave the Commission broad authority to "regulate" and "fix" attorney fees. . . . "). Consequently, 
because the Commission has the power and jurisdiction to fix the Law Firm's fee, this court lacks 
jurisdiction. See Id. at 1265 ("[T]he Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the 
lawfulness of attorney fees charged in cases brought before it, whether the case was successful or 
not."); see also Sheppick, 922 P.2d at 773 ("District courts have no jurisdiction whatsoever over cases that 
fall within the purview of the Worker's Compensation Act.") (citations omitted) 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, I grant the Hospital's motion and deny the Law Firm's 
motion. The case is dismissed. No further order is necessary to effectuate this decision. 
DATED this /£>4ky of January, 2011. 
BY THE COURT: 
DENO G. HIMONAS 
District Court Judge 
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